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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
compensation act] grows out of an accident"5 which brings into
effect an implied contract without which recovery could not be
had. Strictly speaking, it is more accurate to say that the cause of
action, based on contract, 6 grew out of and was incorporated in
the employment agreement; the accident was but an event which
completed the employer's liability. Therefore, the case under dis-
cussion should not properly be termed an "action or proceeding
.. growing out of any accident or collision" so as to fall within
the purview of the Louisiana nonresident motorist statute.
Moreover, the state's power to obtain jurisdiction ratione
personae over a nonresident defendant by substituted service
should be limited to cases wherein the cause does in fact arise out
of the defendant's conduct on the state highways.8 It would seem,
then, that any statute which purports to extend this rule to cases
not arising out of conduct on the highways would be unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the due process clause of the federal Con-
stitution.
A.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-DUE PROCESS OF
LAW-SALARY DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NEGRO SCHOOL TEACHER-
Action by a negro school teacher and negro teachers' association
to obtain a declaratory judgment that the fixing by the school
board of salaries of negro teachers at a lower rate than that of
white teachers of equal qualifications and experience, perform-
ing the same duties, was violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also
prayed an injunction against such discrimination. The action was
dismissed on motion without going to trial. Held, the facts ad-
5. Maddry v. Moore Bros. Lumber Co., 197 So. 651, 653 (La. 1940).
6. The Louisiana rule is that action for compensation under a workmen's
compensation act is based on contract and not tort. Legendre v. Barker, 5
La. App. 618 (1927); Hargis v. McWilliams Co., 119 So. 88 (La. App. 1928).
7. La. Act 86 of 1928, § 1, as amended by La. Act 184 of 1932.
8. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927), and
cases following the principle postulated therein. Moore v. Payne, 35 F. (2d)
232 (W.D. La. 1929); Schilling v. Odlebak, 177 Minn. 90, 93, 224 N.W. 694, 696
(1929): "Laws like our statute cannot be construed as a hostile discrimina-
tion against nonresidents. The implied or constructive appointment is con-
sistent with the necessities involved. The nonresident is subject to it only by
his own conduct. The individual, in using the modern highway, must recog-
nize the police power which is the basis of all highway regulation measures."
(Italics supplied.) See also Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident
Motorists (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 325; Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions
(1929) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427; Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists
(1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563.
[Vol. III
1940] NOTES
mitted by the motion to dismiss constitute an inequality in pay-
ment which is a clear discrimination on the ground of race that
"falls squarely within the inhibition of both the due process and
the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Order reversed and cause remanded. Alston v. School Board of
City of Norfolk, 112 F. (2d) 922 (C.C.A. 4th, 1940).1
It is permissible under the equal protection clause for the
states to separate the races in the enjoyment of privileges, but a
state law which discriminates against any class of people so
separated, solely on the ground of race, is invalid.2 By state law
negroes may, therefore, under the Constitution be segregated in
public carriers' and separated into schools of their own,' pro-
vided "substantially equal advantages" are afforded both groups.'
They may not, however, as indicated in the opinion in the prin-
cipal case," be excluded on the grounds of race alone from ser-
vice on petit' or grand juries;8 nor may they be discriminated
against with respect to participating in party primaries" and
elections, 0 owning and occupying property," Pullman accommo-
1. It is interesting to note that the writer of this opinion, Judge John
J. Parker, was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1930 by Mr. Hoover. His
confirmation by the Senate was opposed largely by organized labor and cer-
tain negro groups. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People charged that Judge Parker in his campaign for the governorship of
North Carolina in 1920 had "flagrantly and openly flouted the provisions of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments." The reference was to Judge
Parker's expressed disapproval of the negro taking a part in politics. New
York Times, March 30, 1930, p. 3, cols. 4, 5.
2. In Missouri v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349, 59 S.Ct. 232, 236, 83 L.Ed. 208,
213 (1938) the court said: "The admissibility of laws separating the races in
the enjoyment of privileges afforded by the States rests wholly upon the equal-
ity of the privileges which the laws give to the separated groups within the
State." This principle was also enunciated in Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485,
24 L.Ed. 547 (1877); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed.
256 (1896); Davenport v. Cloverport, 72 Fed. 689 (D.C. Ky. 1896).
3. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).
4. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 24 L.Ed. 547 (1877).
5. Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1361, at 296 (C.C.
La. 1878): "Any classification which preserves substantially equal school
advantages does not impair any rights, and is not prohibited by the con-
stitution of the United States. Equality of rights does not necessarily imply
identity of rights."
6. Alston v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 112 F. (2d) 992, 996 (C.C.A.
4th, 1940).
7. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879).
8. Pierre v. State, 306 U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 757 (1939).
9. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759 (1927); Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88 A.L.R. 458 (1932).
10. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340, L.R.A.
1916A, 1124 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872, 83 L.Ed. 1281
(1939).
11. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149, L.R.A.
1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201 (1917).
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dations on railroads,12 educational facilities,13 division of school
funds,14 or the pursuit of a trade or vocation.15 The prohibitions
of the equal protection clause apply to the actions of all agencies
of the state, 6 which includes the defendant.
Though negro teachers may validly be confined to teaching
in negro schools, the doctrines already enunciated by the Su-
preme Court relative to the equal protection clause clearly up-
hold the contention that they may not be paid less than those of
the white race solely on the basis of race. 7 Moreover, it appears
that a lowering of the qualifications requisite for negro teachers,
in order to justify a lower salary scale, would deny equal advan-
tages to school children of the negro race. This result would ren-
der the action vulnerable under the doctrine of Missouri v.
Canada.'
Was the action of the defendant also a violation of due pro-
cess of law? It is difficult to see how there was any deprivation
of property, and liberty was involved only in the rather atten-
uated sense that the earning possibilities of members of the af-
fected class were relatively restricted. Thus it is doubtful that
it was proper for the decision to be predicated in part on the
due process clause.
The implications of the instant case extend beyond the pub-
lic school systems; they affect any sort of public employment.
It would appear difficult, however, as a practical matter, to make
12. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 235 U.S. 151, 35 S.Ct. 69, 59 L.Ed.
169 (1914).
13. Missouri v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208 (1938).
14. Davenport v. Cloverport, 72 Fed. 689 (D.C. Ky. 1896).
15. Chaires v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755, 139 S.E. 559, 55 A.L.R. 230 (1927).
16. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 175 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed.
979 (1897).
17. The decision is in accord with the United States District Court's
holding in the recent case of Mills v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel
County, 30 F. Supp. 245 (D.C. Md. 1939). The district court held that where
the salary schedule resulted in a discrimination between white and colored
teachers based chiefly on race, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction
against the continuation of such discrimination to the extent that it was
based solely on race. However, neither the plaintiff nor any other negro
teacher was entitled to an identical salary with white teachers In equivalent
positions, inasmuch as some discretion must be left to the school board in
determining actual salaries according to efficiency and professional attain-
ments. In a previous suit by the same plaintiff [Mills v. Lowndes, 26 F. Supp.
792 (D.C. Md. 1939)] the question of discrimination was fully discussed but
an injunction was refused because the proper party had not been sued.
18. 305 U.S. 337, 351, 59 S.Ct. 232, 237, 83 L.Ed. 208, 214 (1938). In this
decision the Supreme Court held that the state must provide for negroes
"facilities for legal education substantially equal to those which the State
there afforded for persons of the white race ...... This doctrine would apply
to other departments of the educational system.
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out an unconstitutional discrimination unless the positions in
question were fairly well standardized as to qualifications, duties
and salaries.
E.A.M.
CORPORATIONS-IMPLIED REPEAL OF BY-LAwS BY ACTION OF THE
DIRECTORs-Plaintiff, who was elected comptroller by the board
of directors of defendant company for a period of one year, was
dismissed without cause. The by-laws provided that the board
of directors should elect officers to serve during the pleasure of
the board but authorized the board to make, alter or change the
by-laws. Held, that since the board of directors had authority to
make, alter and change the by-laws, their action in electing plain-
tiff for a period of one year abrogated the by-laws to that extent,
and plaintiff is entitled to the balance due under his contract.
Hill v. American Co-operative Ass'n, 197 So. 241 (La. 1940).
The power to make or amend the by-laws of a corporation
ordinarily rests in the stockholders, but this power may be given
to the board of directors.' When the power to make the by-laws
rests in the stockholders, the general rule is that they may not
be waived by the board of directors, and any act by the board in
contravention thereof is ultra vires. However, the courts have
uniformly held, as in the instant case, that if the board of direc-
tors is given the power to make or alter the by-laws, it may
waive any of them., In reaching the above conclusion the court
distinguished two earlier Louisiana cases4 in which this power
had been retained by the stockholders. In both of these cases it
1. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 28, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1109, I; KIix v.
Polish Roman Catholic St. Stanislaus Parish, 137 Mo. App. 347, 118 S.W. 1171
(1909); North Milwaukee Town-Cite Co. No. 2 v. Bishop, 103 Wis. 492, 79 N.W.
785 (1899). ..... the power to adopt by-laws resides Inherently and primarily
In the stockholders ... in the absence of anything in the charter or general
laws to the contrary." 8 Fletcher, Corporations (1931) 645, § 4172.
2. Hunter v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 13 (1874); Fowler v. Great
Southern Tel. & Tel. Co., 104 La. 751, 29 So. 271 (1901); Mulrey v. Shawmut
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 86 Mass. 116, 81 Am. Dec. 689 (1862); Douglass v. Mer-
chants' Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 484, 23 N.E. 806 (1890).
3. Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F. (2d) 636 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1930); State v. Wiley, 100 Ind. App. 438,'196 N.E. 153 (1935); Bank of Holly
Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss. 421, 38 Am. Rep. 330 (1880); Farmer's State Bank
v. Haun, 30 Wyo. 322, 222 Pac. 45 (1924).
4. Hunter v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 13 (1874); Fowler v. Great
Southern Tel. & Tel. Co., 104 La. 751, 755, 29 So. 271, 272 (1901). In the latter
case the court did not find that the plaintiff was employed by the year and
therefore the discussion concerning waiver of by-laws was dictum.
